9 Rules of War Analysis by Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr. (Ret.) Los Angeles Times March 2, 1991 Page A6 (excerpt) The nine classic principles of war provide a framework for comparing the Vietnam and Persian Gulf wars. The first and perhaps the most important principle is that of the Objective. In Vietnam, 70% of the generals were uncertain of the goals of the war. That statistic might well have applied to the Iraqi army, but among coalition forces the objectives were clear. The Offensive is the second principle--carry the war to the enemy and destroy his armed forces. The national policy of containment ruled out that principle in the Vietnam War. In the Gulf, the military's hands were untied for the first time since World War II. It was a difference Hussein failed to anticipate. Mass and Economy of Force are the next two interrelated principles. Mass dictates you put your main effort toward attainment of your main objectives, while secondary objectives are covered by an Economy of Force. It was the Soviet Union that enabled the United States to mass its forces in the Gulf and leave an economy of force to guard Central Europe. In what Hussein must have seen as a terrible betrayal, his erstwhile Soviet ally gave tacit approval to removal of the U.S. VII Corps from Central Europe, where for decades it had guarded against a Soviet attack there. It was that VII Corps, with its 1st and 3rd Armored divisions, its brigades from the 2nd Armored and 3rd Infantry divisions and its 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment that provided the heavy punch for Gen. Schwarzkopf's main attack. And getting them there involved yet another principle, that of Maneuver. Not only were forces moved from Europe, they were moved from the United States as well. The logistics task of transporting over half a million troops along with their arms, supplies and equipment was truly a Herculean effort. Consider ammunition stocks alone. For planning purposes, the daily supply rate for an armored or mechanized division is 5,000 tons. Gen. Schwarzkopf said they had a 60-day supply on hand. That's 300,000 tons. Then multiply that by all the U.S. and allied divisions in country and the figures are in the millions. Security and Surprise are the next two reciprocal principles. In Vietnam, security was almost non-existent. But the coalition's maneuver plans were kept secret to the very end, enabling the allied armies to achieve both operational and tactical surprise against the enemy forces. While there was some whining and sniveling about restrictions on press coverage, in the end the reasons for such restrictions were obvious. The principle of Simplicity is a kind of litmus test for the other principles. The Vietnam War was one of the most complicated and convoluted wars ever waged, and the confusion demonstrated itself on the battlefield. Desert Storm, by contrast, was the model of simplicity, especially in the lines of communication, command and control. This was especially noteworthy, for, like Vietnam, politics made it impossible to achieve the principle of Unity of Command (that is, subordinating all forces to a single leader). But through cooperation among the allies, unity of purpose to a remarkable degree was achieved nonetheless in both the multination air campaign and the ground campaign that followed. ------------------------------------ Extract of principles from above article 1. Objective (set and know your goals) 2. Offensive (carry the war to the enemy, destroy his forces) 3. Mass (main effort covers attainment of main objective) 4. Economy of Force (covers secondary objectives) 5. Maneuver (logistical support of forces) 6. Security (keep your plans, strategies secret) 7. Surprise (enemy doesn't anticipate the tactics & operations) 8. Unity of Command (all forces subordinate to a single leader) 9. Simplicity (litmus test of first 8 principles)