Motives
                          18 September 2001

I suspect that there are three main motives behind the Bush Administration's
response to the attacks a week ago:

1.  Take out those responsible, and thereby prevent further attacks,
    at least in the short, and possibly medium, term future.

    Whether or not any excessive level of retaliation fuels a continuing
    cycle of retribution is of little concern, as evidence suggests
    someone else will likely be sitting behind the desk in the Oval
    Office by the time any the next cycle peaks.  Moreover, it's not
    even necessary to ascribe to the current administration that level of
    calculating cynicism; a common pitfall for governments is to believe
    their own propaganda, in this case the belief that there's no such
    thing as US imperialism and therefore no possible rational explanation
    for what happened.  They may actually believe it's an unexplainable
    evil that won't reappear if its current agents are stamped out.

2.  Amass power.  This is always one of the goals of governments, and its
    importance to those currently in power is evidenced by Mr. Fleischer's
    remarks during the press conference on 17 September 2001.

    The fact that most eyes are now on the (very real) external
    threats to America has provided a distraction that power-hungry
    individuals will use to their own advantage.  We've already seen how
    the current administration has tried to construe what is at best a
    limited constitutional mandate to form a caretaker administration
    as a popular mandate for an ideologically-based set of programs that
    the majority voted against.  In light of Fleischer's recent remarks
    (it's early in the game, but I haven't seen a rush to denounce them),
    I have become very worried, and decided to focus most of my energy
    on our would-be protectors.  There's enough eyes already on the
    external adversary they are fighting.

3.  Glorify militarism.  War is the health of the state; in that sense,
    this could be considered a sub-goal of goal number two.

    What action takes place will, alas, most likely be in that untenable
    middle ground between limited police action total war.  The former
    provides an insufficient opportunity for the glorification of
    militarism; the cost of the latter tends to drive home to the public
    the awful reality of raw force, and provoke the asking of unpleasant
    questions that those in power would rather leave unasked.